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Myanmar’s Political Transformation: A Bird’s Eye View
For the most time since independence in 1948, Myanmar had been ruled by a ruthless
military junta which also controlled large swathes of the economy. In 2008, the military
promulgated, as part of its so-called “roadmap to democracy” process, a new constitution
which foresaw the holding of free and fair elections for the country’s new bicameral
parliament. Notably, the military retained a de facto veto over future constitutional
changes by reserving a quarter of the seats in both houses of parliament for military
appointees. The new constitution also stipulated that the ministries for defence, home,
and border affairs needed to be headed by military appointees, thus enshrining pre-
rogatives for the military and paving the way for a system of hybrid governance.
2011 marked the beginning of a process of political transformation, with Senior
General Than Shwe stepping down as head of the armed forces and as head of state. His
hand-picked successor in the latter office, Thein Sein, became the first democratically
elected president of Myanmar. Thein Sein proved willing to work with Aung San Suu
Kyi, the leader of the oppositional National League for Democracy (NLD) which suc-
cessfully registered for national elections later in the year. In the parliamentary by-
elections of 2012, the NLD won forty-three of the available forty-five seats, with
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Aung San Suu Kyi becoming a member of the House of Representatives. The 2015
general elections, the first openly contested elections since 1990, then saw the NLD
win a sizeable majority in both houses of parliament, making it not only the gov-
erning party but also ensuring the 2016 election of its candidate Htin Kyaw as the
first civilian president of Myanmar. Being constitutionally barred from the pre-
sidency herself, Aung San Suu Kyi was elected in 2016 to a newly created office,
the State Counsellor of Myanmar, making her the de facto head of government.
These developments created high expectations inside and outside the country and
led optimistic observers to believe that the country had now embarked on a genuine
transition to democracy. In any case, the unexpected, quickly evolving political
opening meant that Myanmar was now more democratic than at any point in the past
half century (Simpson et al., 2018: 433).
However, the following three years were marked not only by a lack of further deep-
going political – or, for that matter, economic – reforms and a lacklustre peace process
but also by a most brutal ethnic-cleansing campaign carried out by the army against
Muslim Rohingya in Rakhine province as well as the general deterioration of political
freedoms and civil rights (cf. Chambers and McCarthy, 2018: 3–8; Walton, 2018: 312–
318). Aung San Suu Kyi’s refusal to criticise the atrocities committed by the military in
Rakhine province led to the seventy-four-year old, who has once been hailed as a beacon
of democracy, falling from grace in the “West” and beyond. Questions were also raised
as to whether the NLD really stood for the whole of Myanmar or only for its Bamar
ethnic majority. Myanmar’s political development path in recent years serves as a useful
reminder – if any was needed – that political liberalisation does not necessarily mean
transition to democracy.
Going to press less than a year before the 2020 general elections in Myanmar, this
special issue explores the state of political transformation in Myanmar since 2011. In
this introduction, we first place Myanmar’s political transformation in global and
regional context. We then sketch the issues facing the country’s political transfor-
mation process and finally provide an overview of the contributions to the special
issue. The special issue originated from the conference “Shaping Past, Present, and
Future: Political Parties and State Transformation in Myanmar” which was held in
November 2018 in Yangon and organised by the GIGA German Institute of Global and
Area Studies in cooperation with Initiative Austausch and the Myanmar Office of the
Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES). The guest editors of the special issue would like to
thank the Goethe Institute in Yangon for providing an excellent conference venue, the
former country director of the FES in Myanmar, Alexey Yusupov, for his unflagging
support, and last, but certainly not least, our colleagues in academia who either
responded enthusiastically to our call for additional papers or who agreed to serve as
anonymous reviewers for the papers submitted for this special issue. A separate
bilingual (Burmese/English) publication, edited by Richard Roewer, U Myat Thu and
Han Htoo Khant Paing, featuring short versions of a selected number of conference
papers, is scheduled to be published in Myanmar in cooperation with the Yangon office
of the FES in spring 2020.
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Myanmar’s Political Transformation in Global and Regional
Perspective
How does Myanmar’s political transformation fit into the broader picture of political
transformation at the global and regional levels? Whereas closed autocracies still
accounted for around half of the world’s countries in 1980, by 2017 their share had
dropped to around 12 per cent of regimes in the world. Half of the world’s countries
qualified in 2017 as either liberal or electoral democracies while electoral autocracies
were the most common form of dictatorship (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019: 1097). Yet,
while the world today is more democratic than at any point in the twentieth century,
almost one-third of the world’s population lives in countries undergoing what the authors
of a recent report on global democracy call “autocratisation.” Autocratisation is an
umbrella term that covers erosion in democratic countries (“democratic backsliding”),
the breakdown of democracy, and the worsening of conditions in electoral authoritarian
countries (V-Dem Institute, 2019: 14, 15).
More specifically, Anna Lührmann and Staffan I. Lindberg (2019: 1102) argue that a
“third wave of autocratization” – following on the first and second reverse wave
occurring, respectively, 1922–1942 and 1960–1975 – has been underway since 1994. It
gained momentum in recent years, affecting populous countries such as Brazil, India,
Turkey, and the United States as well as several Eastern European countries. According
to Lührmann and Lindberg (2019: 1103), “[b]y 2017, the third wave of autocratization
dominated with the reversals outnumbering the countries making progress. This has not
occurred since 1940.” Notably, the number of liberal democracies has declined from
forty-four in 2008 to thirty-nine in 2018 (V-Dem Institute, 2019: 15) while “[f]reedom of
expression and the media, as well as the freedom of civil society, and to some extent the
rule of law, are the areas under most severe attack by governments over the last ten years
of the current third wave of autocratization” (V-Dem Institute, 2019: 17).
Christian Haerpfer and his co-authors concur that the reverse wave of democratisa-
tion, coupled with rising authoritarianism and electoral triumphs of right-wing populism,
“has nourished a new pessimism about the prospects of democracy and a general sense of
democracy in crisis” (Haerpfer et al., 2019: xii). More optimistically inclined observers
may point to the fact that over the past ten years more than twenty countries have become
more democratic, testifying to the continued appeal of democratic values (V-Dem
Institute, 2019: 25). The list includes countries as diverse as Armenia, Burkina Faso,
Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tunisia, and Myanmar. Myanmar also stands out as one of the very
few countries in Asia that have become more democratic in recent years. Whereas the
1980s and 1990s witnessed no less than seven countries in East Asia experiencing
democratic openings – the Philippines in 1986, South Korea in 1986, Mongolia in 1990,
Cambodia in 1991, Taiwan and Thailand in 1992, and Indonesia in 1998 – by the end of
second decade of the twenty-first century two of these, Cambodia and Thailand, had
reverted to authoritarianism, another one, the Philippines, saw a democratically elected
leader engaging in authoritarian populism while inclusive democracy was under strain in
other democracies in the region such as India, Indonesia, and Japan (cf. Grugel and
Bishop, 2014: 308–337; Shin and Tusalem, 2019). With even mainland China having
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turned more authoritarian again under President Xi Jinping, Larry Diamond’s suggestion
that the region might be on the cusp of the next wave of democratisation (Diamond,
2012) had not borne out, at least not in the short term. As Doh Chull Shin and Rollin F.
Tusalem (2019: 417) conclude, “East Asia remains a region markedly resistant to the
global wave of democratization. Overall, democratization in East Asia has been more
like an ebb-and-flow tide rather than a surging wave.” Against the background of these
trends at the regional level as well troubling trends at the global level, it was no surprise
that, at least for some time, so much hope was invested in Myanmar’s political trans-
formation process.
How has Myanmar’s political transformation in recent years been reflected in some
well-known democracy indexes? Whereas the country’s political liberalisation since the
beginning of the twenty-first century’s second decade has seen Myanmar go up in all
global and regional rankings, the characterisation of Myanmar’s current political regime
differs depending on the typologies, criteria, and operationalisations used in the
respective indexes and sub-indexes. To start with, the Democracy sub-index of the
biannual Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) makes use of a fivefold typology of
political regimes, ranging from “democracy in consolidation” to “hard-line autocracy.”
The BTI assesses the state of democracy in currently 129 countries – established
democracies are covered in a separate index – in terms of stateness, political partici-
pation, the rule of law, the stability of democratic institutions as well as political and
social integration. The index saw Myanmar going up from second-last position, behind
only Somalia, in the 2012 BTI (which reflected developments until early 2011) to 104th
out of 129 countries assessed in the 2018 BTI, placing Myanmar, in regional terms,
between Cambodia and Vietnam. Yet, the 2018 edition of the BTI still considered
Myanmar a “hard-line autocracy,” not quite passing the bar set for a “moderate auto-
cracy” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, n.d.).
Myanmar is also still considered an authoritarian regime in the 2018 edition of the
annually updated Economist Democracy Index (EDI, each edition covering the year in
question). The index uses a fourfold typology of political regimes (full democracy,
flawed democracy, hybrid regimes, authoritarian regime) and is based on measurements
in five categories: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of
government, political participation, and political culture. Whereas only three countries
ranked below Myanmar in the 2010 edition of the EDI, namely, Uzbekistan, Turkme-
nistan, and North Korea, Myanmar moved up in the 2018 edition to 118th position out of
the then 167 countries examined in total, and to 22nd position out of the 28 countries
examined in Asia where it sat between Pakistan, still considered a hybrid regime, and
Cambodia (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019). In the annual assessments of Freedom
House, which uses a simple trifold classification of political regimes (free, partly free,
not free), Myanmar moved up from “not free” in the 2011 report (covering the preceding
year) to “partly free” in the most recent 2019 report (Freedom House, n.d., 2019).
Finally, the V-Dem Institute and its V-Dem data set, which in recent years has
become a go-to resource for political scientists, employs a fourfold typology of political
regimes (liberal democracies, electoral democracies, electoral autocracies, closed
autocracies). According to data presented in the V-Dem Institute Annual Democracy
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become a go-to resource for political scientists, employs a fourfold typology of political
regimes (liberal democracies, electoral democracies, electoral autocracies, closed
autocracies). According to data presented in the V-Dem Institute Annual Democracy
Report 2019, Myanmar was considered a closed autocracy in 2008 but had moved by
2018 to electoral autocracy status. Out of the 179 countries assessed, Myanmar stood at
119th position in V-Dem’s Liberal Democracy Index in 2018 (V-Dem Institute, 2019:
55). Whereas the 2019 report noted “fragile improvement” in Myanmar between 2008
and 2018 in terms of clean elections, freedom of association, freedom of expression,
judicial constraints on the executive, legislative constraints on the executive, partici-
patory and deliberative components, and in term of state fragility, significant weaknesses
were noted in terms of equality before the law, egalitarian components, the polarisation
of society, and last, but not least, in terms of military interference (V-Dem Institute,
2019: 24). In sum, all these indexes indicate that, despite the progress made in recent
years, Myanmar continues to face serious issues in terms of political governance, being
still far away from genuine democratisation. In the next section, we change perspective
and take a closer look at Myanmar’s political liberalisation since 2011.
Myanmar’s Political Liberalisation Close Up: Why, How
and With What Effect?
Myanmar’s political opening after 2011 caught most observers by surprise. Until the late
2000s, the dominant topic had been the extraordinary resilience of the military regime
which did not liberalise despite domestic pressures and external sanctions (Hlaing,
2009). While there had been assessments of the possibilities for democratisation, few
observers predicted the political opening that followed the 2008 Constitution, the 2010
parliamentary elections and the 2011 change of government. Today, there is consider-
able disagreement among scholars about the possible causes, pathways, and ultimate
outcomes of Myanmar’s liberalisation process (Cheesman et al., 2014; Lall, 2016). With
structuralist explanations referring to class formations or socio-economic conditions
being of rather limited value to explain the political opening, scholars quickly turned to
agential factors instead. This approach to democratisation, which links the bargaining
between soft-liners within the authoritarian regime and moderate democrats to the nature
of the evolving regime, has been particularly useful for explaining Myanmar’s trajectory
and the character of the evolving polity.
We can identify two rivalling scholarly camps with competing explanations and
expectations (Stokke and Aung, 2019). One camp, which we might call optimists, sees
the transformation since 2011 as caused by changes at the apex of the military regime,
providing a rare opportunity for democratic reforms. The retirement of Senior General
Than Shwe in March 2011 and the rise of Thein Sein and other reformist actors within
the military regime provided room for a more constructive role of civil society and
international actors who abandoned their former confrontative strategies towards the
military regime (Lall, 2016; Pederson, 2014). While the international community sus-
pended their sanction policy, moderate civil society organisations such as Myanmar
Egress, Vahu Development Institute or the Euro-Burma Office – known as the “Third
Force” – lobbied for continued political reforms within the country and for more
development aid from outside (Camroux and Egreteau, 2010; Hlaing, 2014). The
reforms eventually ushered in legislative changes that allowed Aung San Suu Kyi and
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the NLD to participate in the 2012 by-elections and the 2015 general elections, leading to
the electoral landslide of the NLD and the first civilian government in half a century
(Lidauer, 2012; Maung, 2016). The informal alliance between military reformers and
civil society also paved the way for a new peace initiative which culminated in the
National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) signed by eight of the fifteen ethnic armed
organisations in October 2015. “Optimists” consequently see the political transition
caused by a split within the military itself, providing a unique window of opportunity for
reforms and finally leading to a pact between military reformers and democracy icon
Aung San Suu Kyi. This gave way to a weakly institutionalised electoral democracy,
which remains a work in progress until this day. Despite these reforms, peace remains
elusive since some of the most powerful ethnic armed organisations, including the
Kachin Independence Organisation, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army,
the Taang National Liberation Army, the United Wa State Army, and the Arakan Army,
did not sign the NCA.
Scholars in the second camp see Myanmar’s reform era in a much more negative
light. They interpret Myanmar’s reforms as a survival strategy of the quasi-military
regime to overcome the danger of factionalism and to increase regime durability by
creating power-sharing institutions (Bünte, 2014; Croissant and Kamerling, 2013;
Egreteau, 2016). These scholars interpret the reforms as a long-term strategy of the
military, already starting in the early 2000s. Following a decade of massive moder-
nisation, the army embarked on a top-down reform policy which aimed at enhancing
regime stability and gaining international legitimacy (Callahan, 2014; Chow and Easley,
2016; Egreteau, 2016; Huang, 2013). This interpretation assumes that the Tatmadaw are
the dominant, coherent, and, above all, unified force, which have been controlling
Myanmar’s politics – directly or indirectly – since independence (Callahan, 2003;
Nakanishi, 2013; Selth, 2001). The military’s self-proclaimed leading role in national
affairs is rooted in the Tatmadaw’s contributions to state-building, in the rising
instability of the early postcolonial period and the rising ethnic rebellions which led to
tensions with the civilian government, culminating in the 1958–1960 military caretaker
government and the 1962 military coup. The military ruled the country from 1962 to
2011. It reorganised after the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, with the Burma Socialist
Programme Party getting replaced by the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(renamed State Peace and Development Council in 1995). Ethnic rebellions at the
periphery and the pro-democracy movement in the centre challenged military rule but
also contributed to its coherence until the retreat from direct military rule in 2011 (Bünte,
2018a; Callahan, 2014). The liberalisation since 2011 was consequently more imposed
than pacted and reflected the military’s changing (security) interests (Stokke and Aung,
2019). Lee Jones (2014) sees the liberalisation driven by gains in state-building in the
1990s and the vested interests of the military in the borderlands. Since the 1990s, the
military has become the dominant actor both in politics and the economy with its own
business conglomerates and crony companies, providing benefits in terms of health,
education, and access to welfare for military personnel and their families. The opening
up consequently also served the purpose of securing the personal and corporate interests
of the praetorian elite (Bünte, 2018a; Ford et al., 2014; McCarthy, 2019).
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While these two competing interpretations of Myanmar’s transition are not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive, they differ in their analysis of the main causes and drivers of
change. What is even more important: they infer different possibilities for change and
chances for further democratisation. While optimists see peace and democracy as a work
in progress (and ongoing duty of democrats and political parties), the second viewpoint
emphasises that change is primarily shaped by the Tatmadaw’s commitment to peace
and security. What kind of polity is evolving? As noted above, Myanmar’s liberalisation
has not yet passed the threshold to full democratisation. Scholars unanimously agree that
it is a hybrid regime combining authoritarian and democratic elements. Myanmar is at
best an electoral democracy heavily skewed towards praetorianism (Bünte, 2018a;
Egreteau, 2016; Huang, 2017; Stokke and Aung, 2019). Even since political liberal-
isation in 2011, there have been serious shortcomings inhibiting the democratic process:
1. A high degree of militarisation and reserved domains for the military: Key areas
are exempted from the control of elected representatives. In certain matters of
state security, the Tatmadaw are solely in charge. According to the 2008 Con-
stitution, the military holds key ministries in the government: the Ministry of
Defence, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Ministry of Border Affairs, with
all ministers being nominated by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
The military also controls the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC), a
powerful institution responsible for state security – although this body so far has
not been convened by Aung San Suu Kyi (Bünte, 2018a). The Tatmadaw also had
an immense influence on local affairs since the General Administration Depart-
ment (GAD), which formed the backbone of the country’s administration, had
been placed under the Ministry of Home Affairs. The GAD was moved to the
Ministry of the Union Government (and thus put under civilian control) only in
January 2019. Additionally, the Tatmadaw have the right to administer their own
affairs independently; the Commander-in-Chief is the highest arbiter of military
justice1 and can assume control of the state in case of an emergency. The high
degree of military power shows that the military’s mode of operation has only
shifted from ruler to guardian and that a reform of civil–military relations
remains a top priority. However, in her first term in office the NLD has not
prioritised reforming civil–military relations and the restructuring of the GAD
remained the only step towards a demilitarisation of the state (Bünte, 2018a;
Myoe, 2017). Kristian Stokke and Soe Myint Aung (2019) also highlight the
lack of government control over key areas of economic and social development
in the periphery. These are under the control of powerful non-state actors such as
ethnic armed organisations, militias, or border guard forces. We also find various
forms of mixed authority and hybrid governance arrangements that raise critical
questions about control and legitimacy (South, 2018).
2. Weak political representation: Myanmar’s electoral democracy allows for dem-
ocratic elections for both national and regional parliaments. However, only 75
per cent of the country’s parliamentary seats are elected, while 25 per cent are
appointed by the Commander-in-Chief. While the November 2010 elections had
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been widely regarded as deeply flawed, the 2015 elections were generally con-
sidered fair and representing the will of the people. However, the definition of the
demos was based on the 1982 citizenship law and, consequently, thousands of
Rohingyas and members of other minorities (and many Chinese and Indians)
were disenfranchised. This raises serious questions about political equality in the
country (South and Lall, 2018). The first-past-the-post electoral system also
prevents adequate proportional parliamentary representation in ethnically diverse
areas (Lemargie et al., 2014). Consequently, we can conclude that parliamentary
representation is heavily distorted – favouring the military over civilians and
Bamar over ethnic minorities. Also, men are heavily over-represented in parlia-
mentary realms – female representatives make up only 13.7 per cent of all elected
MPs in 2016 (Egreteau, 2017; Sein Latt et al., 2016: ii; Stokke and Aung, 2019).
Moreover, political parties display deficits in terms of representation: they are
often poorly institutionalised and highly centralised. They are built around pow-
erful patrons and exhibit weak links to the general population (Stokke et al.,
2017). While political representation through intermediary party channels has
its limitations, they cannot be substituted through civil society organisations
either. Most of the NGOs lack access and influence – though particularly under
the Thein Sein government some NGOs were invited to provide inputs – there are
only few examples of substantive civil society impact on government policy.
Although they have important roles to play in Myanmar’s society, civil society
actors cannot provide alternative channels for political representation. Myanmar
consequently lacks substantive representation (Stokke and Aung, 2019).
3. Limited freedoms, civil liberties, and a weak rule of law: Whereas the extent of
political freedoms widened before the 2015 elections, it is generally acknowl-
edged that under the NLD government the political spaces for certain forms of
political action have narrowed again (Bünte, 2018b). While human rights groups,
journalists, and NGOs complain about lacking spaces and overt government (and
military) repression, ultranationalist groups and ultraconservative monks have
used the liberalisation for increased mobilisation – with devastating conse-
quences for the multi-religious society (Walton and Hayward, 2014). Civil soci-
ety groups have pointed to the rise in defamation cases brought against journalists
and activists under the NLD, which has used section 66(d) of the Telecommu-
nication law to silence and intimidate critics. From 2013 to January 2020, more
than 250 lawsuits were filed, most of them for online defamation by military
officers, government officials, lawmakers, and businessmen close to the military
(Aung, 2020). Press freedom is increasingly under threat – restrictions on media
have been exacerbated; journalists are not allowed to criticise or cover military
affairs nor report from areas of ethnic conflict (Brooten et al., 2019; HRW, 2019).
Myanmar’s political liberalisation has also seen an increasing mobilisation of
ultranationalist Buddhist groups contributing to the outbreak of intercommunal
violence and anti-Muslim sentiments. Hate speech increased, particularly via
new social media communities (Walton and Hayward, 2014). Sectarian violence
and military clearance operations have driven hundreds of thousands of Rohingya
B ü nte et al. 257
been widely regarded as deeply flawed, the 2015 elections were generally con-
sidered fair and representing the will of the people. However, the definition of the
demos was based on the 1982 citizenship law and, consequently, thousands of
Rohingyas and members of other minorities (and many Chinese and Indians)
were disenfranchised. This raises serious questions about political equality in the
country (South and Lall, 2018). The first-past-the-post electoral system also
prevents adequate proportional parliamentary representation in ethnically diverse
areas (Lemargie et al., 2014). Consequently, we can conclude that parliamentary
representation is heavily distorted – favouring the military over civilians and
Bamar over ethnic minorities. Also, men are heavily over-represented in parlia-
mentary realms – female representatives make up only 13.7 per cent of all elected
MPs in 2016 (Egreteau, 2017; Sein Latt et al., 2016: ii; Stokke and Aung, 2019).
Moreover, political parties display deficits in terms of representation: they are
often poorly institutionalised and highly centralised. They are built around pow-
erful patrons and exhibit weak links to the general population (Stokke et al.,
2017). While political representation through intermediary party channels has
its limitations, they cannot be substituted through civil society organisations
either. Most of the NGOs lack access and influence – though particularly under
the Thein Sein government some NGOs were invited to provide inputs – there are
only few examples of substantive civil society impact on government policy.
Although they have important roles to play in Myanmar’s society, civil society
actors cannot provide alternative channels for political representation. Myanmar
consequently lacks substantive representation (Stokke and Aung, 2019).
3. Limited freedoms, civil liberties, and a weak rule of law: Whereas the extent of
political freedoms widened before the 2015 elections, it is generally acknowl-
edged that under the NLD government the political spaces for certain forms of
political action have narrowed again (Bünte, 2018b). While human rights groups,
journalists, and NGOs complain about lacking spaces and overt government (and
military) repression, ultranationalist groups and ultraconservative monks have
used the liberalisation for increased mobilisation – with devastating conse-
quences for the multi-religious society (Walton and Hayward, 2014). Civil soci-
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nication law to silence and intimidate critics. From 2013 to January 2020, more
than 250 lawsuits were filed, most of them for online defamation by military
officers, government officials, lawmakers, and businessmen close to the military
(Aung, 2020). Press freedom is increasingly under threat – restrictions on media
have been exacerbated; journalists are not allowed to criticise or cover military
affairs nor report from areas of ethnic conflict (Brooten et al., 2019; HRW, 2019).
Myanmar’s political liberalisation has also seen an increasing mobilisation of
ultranationalist Buddhist groups contributing to the outbreak of intercommunal
violence and anti-Muslim sentiments. Hate speech increased, particularly via
new social media communities (Walton and Hayward, 2014). Sectarian violence
and military clearance operations have driven hundreds of thousands of Rohingya
into neighbouring Bangladesh. Myanmar’s justice system is failing to provide
necessary justice – in the absence of the rule of law (Cheesman, 2015; Prasse-
Freeman, 2015), the international community has called for an independent
investigation resulting in accusations of crimes against humanity (UN Human
Rights Council, 2018). In December 2019, Aung San Suu Kyi had to defend her
country from accusations of genocide at the International Court of Justice in The
Hague. Domestically, both the government and the military are using the increas-
ing international criticism to rally their supporters behind them and to forge a
unity, which is otherwise lacking in the multi-ethnic and multi-religious country.
4. Institutional weaknesses – centralism and poor separation of powers: The 2008
Constitution provides for elections for both national and regional parliaments.
However, there is no direct democratic link connecting regional parliaments to
regional executives – the chief ministers are appointed by the president. Under
the NLD government, the president even appointed chief ministers from the NLD
in those regions, where the party could not win a majority (e.g. in Rakhine State
and Shan State). Since there is no direct link between regional legislatures and
executives, the current regional parliaments do not have significant powers
and are often not involved in any discussion of policies of the centre (Stokke
and Aung, 2019). This has further alienated ethnic groups that have been
demanding a federal system for decades. Although there have been discussions
to introduce federalism, both the government and the military have refrained
from reforming central–local relations so far. While some argue that the consti-
tution lays a foundation for federalism – the constitution gives regional govern-
ments powers to legislate on resource extraction and collect some minor taxes –
others opine that federalism is superficial at best (Holliday et al., 2015; Kramer,
2015). A reform of central–local relations is thus a necessary reform for substan-
tial democratisation and conflict resolution.
5. Another institutional weakness refers to the system of presidentialism: The pres-
ident and the two vice presidents are not directly elected by the people but by an
electoral college comprised of both chambers of parliament. Since the military
can appoint one candidate as well, at least one vice president is from the military.
Aung San Suu Kyi herself was barred from the presidency due to the nationality
of her sons. After the 2015 election, the NLD decided to create the position of
state counsellor which is similar to the position of prime minister and gives Aung
San Suu Kyi the possibility to coordinate government policies. This law, which
has the same validity as the term of the president but places her above the
president, centralised power in Aung San Suu Kyi’s hands. Checks and balances
eroded (Bünte, 2018c; Crouch, 2019). Apart from the position of state counsellor,
Aung San Suu Kyi assumed four ministerial positions – foreign affairs (to be
included in the NDSC), minister of the president’s office, electricity and energy,
and education.2 A sizeable part of the civilian administration was consequently
under her control – aside from the three ministries remaining under the control of
the military. This concentration of power in Aung San Suu Kyi’s hands did not
have positive effects on Myanmar’s transition: to the contrary, we have
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practically seen some of the same repressive policies as under the military gov-
ernments. Consequently, Kristian Stokke and Soe Myint Aung (2019) argue that
there is a convergence in the understanding of the democratic opening between
the NLD and the Tatmadaw.
6. Authoritarian values and traditional political culture: While there is a lacking
commitment towards democracy at the elite level, we find some clashing atti-
tudes towards democracy in the general population as well. According to the
findings from the 2015 Asia Barometer Survey, Myanmar’s citizens expressed
some of Asia’s highest support for democracy. However, at the same time we find
the lowest support for liberal political values that undergird democratic processes
(Chu et al., 2015: 134). The vast majority of people in Myanmar still adheres to
authoritarian values and beliefs, and the legacy of authoritarianism is deeply
embedded. Over 80 per cent of the respondents expressed support for the idea
that religious authorities should have a say in lawmaking, nearly two-thirds
oppose checks on the executive. Traditional values are still strong: 68 per cent
agree that students should not question the authority of teachers, 81 per cent
reject any form of pluralism (Chu et al., 2015: 136). All this shows that Myan-
mar’s current political culture conflicts with the norms of equality, accountabil-
ity, and pluralism, which is another explanation why the transition after 2015 got
stuck and full democratisation has eluded the country.
The Contributions to this Special Issue
To illuminate some of the many issues surrounding Myanmar’s political transformation
process, the contributors to this special issue provide and employ institutional analysis,
political theory, and legal perspectives. They analyse the development of important
representative institutions as well as the choice and lack of certain public policies in the
NLD era, and they explore why transitional justice did not figure in Myanmar’s recent
political transformation. In the first article, Renaud Egreteau investigates how Myan-
mar’s parliament has changed since 2011 and whether it is undergoing a process of
institutionalisation. Egreteau argues that a parliamentary culture has re-emerged despite
capacity and efficiency problems and the continued dominance of the armed forces. He
attributes this trend in part to the institutional development of the parliament itself, which
now employs about 1,500 permanent staff playing a crucial role in the consolidation of
norms. Routinisation has come to shape an institution that partly develops in line with
democratic practices. For example, the wish for transparency has led to the recording and
publishing of all legislative proceedings. Yet, Egreteau does not simply illustrate the
development of rules, regulations, and proceedings, he also illustrates the differences and
similarities of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and NLD eras.
Egreteau argues that the perception of the USDP era as a time of more open and active
parliamentary debate (when compared to the NLD era) was not due to stronger checks
and balances but rather to the public display of personal rivalries, which was more
common in the USDP. Egreteau’s analysis of the similarities is striking too: contrary to
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publishing of all legislative proceedings. Yet, Egreteau does not simply illustrate the
development of rules, regulations, and proceedings, he also illustrates the differences and
similarities of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and NLD eras.
Egreteau argues that the perception of the USDP era as a time of more open and active
parliamentary debate (when compared to the NLD era) was not due to stronger checks
and balances but rather to the public display of personal rivalries, which was more
common in the USDP. Egreteau’s analysis of the similarities is striking too: contrary to
expectations in 2015, NLD lawmakers have not engaged in more robust government
oversight than their USDP colleagues of the previous term. Indeed, cursory vetting of
government policy remains the norm. These new insights into Myanmar’s re-emerging
parliamentary culture are interesting signposts for Myanmar’s transition. Egreteau
describes the former as “constrained” but “evolving,” the same could be said for the
latter.
The focus on institutional aspects of Myanmar’s political transformation continues in
the second article in which Richard Roewer analyses the organisational structure of the
NLD and its implications for the agency of the party and its role in the transformation
process. With a view to the three faces of party organisation, Roewer illustrates the
relationship between the party in public office, the party in central office, and the party
on the ground. He observes that the organisation of the party has evolved comparatively
little. Indeed, the party’s current constitution resembles its precursor from over thirty
years ago in important ways. This is not without repercussions: whereas the party
constitution generally suggests the democratic election of important party posts, such as
the positions in the party’s central executive committee, it also allows for top-down
appointments. Consequently, and contrary to pre-2015 expectations, the party continues
to become ever more centralised. The party considers this increased centralisation
necessary for retrenching the military’s influence but the approach is unpopular with
NLD members across the party’s three faces. MPs have grown increasingly frustrated
with what they perceive as a lack of political agency. In fact, Roewer argues that the high
degree of centralisation is only possible because of the authority of Aung San Suu Kyi
and might well set the party up for future split. Roewer’s analysis underlines that
Myanmar’s transformation process remains prone to authoritarian backsliding.
While Roewer notes how the institutionalisation of the governing party’s particular
structure is potentially harmful to the political transformation process, Kristian Stokke
examines in his article low levels of institutionalisation in ethnic parties. Myanmar’s
political opening has created new but constrained opportunities for representation,
confronting ethnic political parties with the need to find a place for themselves in this
new political reality. Stokke addresses existing hypotheses accounting for the weak
electoral performance of ethnic parties and their struggle to ensure formal, descriptive,
and substantive representation. He shows how party fragmentation, vote-splitting, low
levels of institutionalisation, capacity limitations, and unclear boundaries of represen-
tation account for the issues that ethnic parties continue to face in a first-past-the-post
system dominated by the NLD and the USDP. Stokke draws parallels between 1988 and
2010, pointing to the proliferation of political parties and issues arising from overlapping
representation claims. He contextualises systemic disadvantages faced by ethnic parties
such as the electoral system and shows that the number of parliamentary seats affected
by vote-splitting is smaller than often assumed. Indeed, developing party platforms that
move beyond ethnic symbolic politics proves to be the more important but also difficult
step towards achieving greater representation. Although many smaller ethnic parties
have merged to counteract vote-splitting, they have so far not been able to revise their
party platforms in meaningful ways. Competing with the NLD and USDP will require
them to create a stronger political narrative. Stokke notes, however, that ethnic parties
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might still improve their standing in the 2020 elections – if not due to their institutional
changes then because of rising dissatisfaction with the NLD government in ethnic
minority areas.
In his article, Matthew Walton explores prevalent negative perceptions of political
parties in Myanmar grounded in Theravāda Buddhist conceptions of human nature as
inherently self-centred, biased, and morally ignorant. Walton shows how moral scepti-
cism of political parties shapes narratives around the legitimacy of political contestants.
He illustrates how major political actors like the military and the NLD have sought to use
moralistic accounts referencing the figure of pu htu zin, a morally deficient being that
encapsulates many of the characteristics of a self-centred political actor. Walton argues
that political parties are understood to promote egoism, effectively channelling or
augmenting the self-centred nature of the pu htu zin. Parties thus stand accused of
promoting narrow, personalistic interests. Walton shows how this critique has appeared –
in various ways – in the writings of U Ba Khaing, a series of military leaders, and Aung
San Suu Kyi. Whereas the interpretations used differ, their purpose is similar as domi-
nant political actors seek to use the critique to elevate their own political legitimacy
while devaluing the legitimacy of others. For example, Walton shows how the perils of
the pu htu zin in politics fed into the military narrative that maturity is necessary to
practice democracy, a move used to discredit the NLD following the 1990 election. Yet,
the notion also shaped the NLD’s desire to present itself as a “Union” party ahead of the
2020 election. The NLD argues that the party works for a “greater goal” rather than for
political objectives of a specific group, thus criticising smaller ethnic parties. Impor-
tantly, Walton’s response to the critique of political parties is not to supplant Burmese
concepts with Western ideas but rather to draw on alternative interpretations evident in
the writings of General Aung San and the nineteenth-century minister U Hpo Hlaing who
present collective, participatory political action as the necessary response to human
moral deficiencies.
In his article, Gerard McCarthy shifts the focus from the development and perception
of institutional aspects of the political transformation to government policy, exploring
how the NLD government has (not) been addressing deep-seated economic inequality in
Myanmar. McCarthy provides a fascinating case study showing how programmatic
political preferences have been shaped by the political developments and authoritarian
legacies of the past thirty years. He notes that although economic justice was a catch-all
theme during Burma’s independence struggle and a defining subject for postcolonial
party politics, matters of class and inequality are now notably absent from the ideology
and policy platform of the NLD. McCarthy traces how the dissembling of Ne Win’s
dysfunctional welfare state, limited market reforms, and the selective suppression of
civil society by the junta in the 1990s and 2000s benefited economic elites and religious
philanthropic networks. More importantly, McCarthy explains why and how the NLD
has come to embrace commercial elites and market liberalisation policies rather than
class-based concerns and redistributive policies. He illustrates how the NLD’s depen-
dence on donations from economic elites has affected some of its political objectives,
importantly the party’s pledge to solve disputes over land grabs, for fear of alienating
donors who the party portrays as integral actors of the democratisation process.
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and policy platform of the NLD. McCarthy traces how the dissembling of Ne Win’s
dysfunctional welfare state, limited market reforms, and the selective suppression of
civil society by the junta in the 1990s and 2000s benefited economic elites and religious
philanthropic networks. More importantly, McCarthy explains why and how the NLD
has come to embrace commercial elites and market liberalisation policies rather than
class-based concerns and redistributive policies. He illustrates how the NLD’s depen-
dence on donations from economic elites has affected some of its political objectives,
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Consequently, McCarthy argues that structural reforms are necessary if the nascent
elements of democracy are to endure in Myanmar.
Whereas McCarthy explores the lack of economic justice, Catherine Renshaw
addresses in the final contribution to this special issue the absence of transitional justice
mechanisms in Myanmar’s political transformation since 2011. Renshaw shows how an
argument that pitied justice against peace and gave preference to the latter came to be
embraced not only by the military and the opposition in Myanmar but also by Western
states and the United Nations. Renshaw also shows how the NLD government tried to
strengthen the rule of law through investigations into allegations of misconduct by the
military but ultimately failed. Against the backdrop of the atrocities committed against
the Rohingya, Renshaw is sceptical about the deterrent effect of international law to
protect minority groups in Myanmar. Renshaw evokes Helen Fein’s “More Murder in the
Middle” thesis to show that partly free states have the highest risk of committing wide-
scale atrocities. Consequently, Renshaw is not optimistic about the further course of
justice in Myanmar, contending that the country’s current state is characterised by
uncertainty and confusion – the very circumstances in which extreme violence becomes
a viable means for achieving political goals. The article, therefore, also calls to abandon
a line of political thinking that values a (fake) peace over transitional justice.
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Notes
1. This can have disastrous effects on human rights, as we have witnessed in the case of the
soldiers who were found guilty of the execution of 10 Rohingya villagers in Inn Din in Rakhine
State and sentenced to ten years in jail by a military court. After the intervention of the
Commander-in-Chief, the soldiers have been released early (Thant, 2019). This not only high-
lights the lacking accountability for severe human rights violations in the country, but also the
ongoing military influence on the justice system.
2. She gave up two of these portfolios shortly after her inauguration (education and energy).
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